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This paper analyses a dimension of the gender pay gap that has received so far a 
limited attention and that concerns not the level but the form of pay. The 
econometric analysis we performed has considered a fairly homogenous type of 
occupation represented by family management and with a great bargaining power 
in setting their rewards. With this strategy we aim at estimating gender disparities 
not driven by sex segregation by positions in firm hierarchy, but  disparities more 
likely linked to preferences and identity. Probit models have been estimated to test 
whether or not the difference between women and men in pay structure of family 
managers (fixed salary or variable earnings) is statistically significant. We obtain 
that the female presence in top executive jobs, even after controlling for a large set 
of firm and workplace characteristics, is associated with a substantial lower 
incidence of the variable payment component. These gender differences in the 
structure of compensation packages are confirmed by IV Probit estimates that 
address potential omitted variables and endogeneity biases. We conclude that 
human capital factors, sectoral segregation or differences between firms are not 
the only drivers of gender differentials in the form of pay. We also suggest that 
lower representation of women in variable earning schemes might be an indicator 
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A recent growing literature based on laboratory experiments and on economic 
models of identity and work incentives contributes to explain gender disparities 
not only in terms of discrimination, work-family conflicts and human capital 
factors, but also on differentials in preferences and behavioural attitudes. 
However, much of this area of research considers gender pay differentials 
between workers in subordinate positions and less evidence is available for top 
corporate jobs. The scant evidence on gender diversities recorded in high levels of 
corporate hierarchy is partly due to the limited number of women who are 
represented in these positions, both in board rooms and in top management 
(Dezso and Ross, 2012). This low presence is particularly striking in the Italian 
economy where, before the introduction of female mandatory quotas of corporate 
boards approved by the Italian Parliament in 2011, only around 6% of board seats 
in listed companies were held by women, a percentage well below that recorded in 
Italian major competitors (Catalyst, 2013: EU Commission 2014). Concerning 
gender gap in firm leadership, however, evidence is mainly focused on board of 
directors of Italian listed companies (Bianco et al. 2011), but no data are offered 
for the vast majority of Italian non listed firms, whose ownership and control are 
mainly concentrated in the hands of families and that are characterised by the 
predominance of small business. Notice also that Italy is an interesting case study 
to analyse gender issues because, according to the Global Gender Gap Index that 
measures the inequality gap between women and men, in 2013, the country was 
only ranked number 97 (out of 142 countries), in the area of economic 




The contribution of this paper is to consider the intersection of two distinctive 
features of the Italian economy, the pervasive strong gender gap and the 
dominance of a model of governance based on family capitalism. In particular we 
first ascertain the presence of women in leadership positions, as top family 
managers. Secondly, we pass to verify whether under family direction, 
compensation structure of family management presents gender heterogeneities 
and a different incentive orientation between women and men. We dispose of a 
particularly rich dataset covering information of compensation structure of top 
management not  only of listed firms,  but virtually of all enterprises of the Italian 
market economy. The data set  has also the advantage of offering information on a 
large array of personnel and firm characteristics which permits to account for most of 
the unobserved heterogeneity that usually affect most available studies on this field. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the related 
literature; section 3 presents the data used and descriptive statistics; section 4 
illustrates the econometric strategy employed and our estimation results; section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
This paper attempts to links together two different themes: gender-based 
differences in adoption of diverse pay schemes and the top management 
compensation earned by family management. We thus reconsider two different 
areas of related literature. The first one concerns the gender compensation gap, 
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 The Global Gender Index is elaborated by the World Economic Forum and the last report refers to 
data for 2013. 
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particularly among high-level managers, the second one focuses on agency 
problems occurring in firms under family leadership. 
Concerning the first area, potential explanations of gender effects in pay 
elements may be highlighted by recent works on gender differences in risk taking, 
confidence  and exposure to competition (see the reviews of Bertrand, 2010 and 
Azmat and Petrongolo, 2014). Indeed, pay schemes are the results of interactions 
between those that allocate these payments and those that receive these schemes 
(Kulich et al. 2011). Personal attributes of the receivers, and in particular women 
personal choices, are relevant features that contribute to reframing earning 
literature in a more comprehensive perspective (Kulich, Ryan, and Haslam, 2007; 
Gomez-Mejia, 2007), where the role of behavioral factors is accounted for. 
Risk 
The first gender disparity concerns risk. The use of variable earnings may be an 
incentive device, but the main constraint is that this device imposes additional 
risk. It means that the strength of the relationship between pay and performance 
should be designed taking into account the responses of who receive these payments 
(Prendergast, 1999) and, eventually, gender disparities in risk aversion. Indeed, 
related literature has shown that the degree of risk aversion may be an area where 
preferences differ by gender, as shown from 15 set of experiments (Charness and 
Gneezy, 2012). The surveys of experimental studies of Eckel and Grossman 
(2008) and Croson and Gneezy (2009) widely document that women are more risk 
averse than men. Concerning top executives, for Denmark, Parrotta and Smith 
(2013) find evidence of greater risk aversion among women. Similar results have 
been obtained for the UK listed companies by Kulich et al. (2011), who also 
signal that” risk aversion is most marked in relation to tasks or activities that are 
typically masculine” (p. 315)2. In addition if men have more equity-based pay, 
they should also have higher total pay to compensate for extra risk, as predicted 
by standard principal-agent theories (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Analogous 
findings have been obtained for female social entrepreneurs by Estrin et al, 
(2014), confirming that “a gender pay gap may arise in part because male have 
different preferences for money, pay and risk” (Estrin et al, 2014, p.10).  
In sum, the male lower risk aversion, with respect to that manifested by 
women, may explain the male stronger orientation to receive payments by results 
with respect to their female counterparts. 
Self-Confidence and Competition 
An additional factor that may cause women and men to make different choices 
over compensation schemes is self-confidence. Jackson et al. (1992) show that, 
regardless of occupational field, women had lower career-peak self-pay 
expectations than men. Barber and Odean (2001), analysing common stock 
investments,  document that in areas such as finance, men are more overconfident 
than women and trade more excessively than their female counterparts; along 
similar lines, Bajtelsmit and VanDerhei (1996) find that women invest their 
pensions more conservatively than men. 
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 Kulich et al (2011, p. 315) suggest that “risk attitudes may be socially constructed rather 
than innate, because “people’s expectations that women are risk averse may reinforce the gender 
gap by encouraging women to choose less risky pay packages. At the same time, such 
expectations may trigger negative reactions toward those women who do not comply with 




A recently growing literature based on laboratory experiments reports that one 
potential source for observed gender imbalances is due to low entry rates of 
women in tournaments and a significant part of these low rates can be accounted 
for by gender differences in confidence. If men are more ‘overconfident’ in their 
success, especially in uncertain situations, one may observe that men are more 
likely to enter tournaments (where the winner takes all), whereas women prefer to 
be compensated piece-rate, as shown by the experimental study of Niederle and 
Vesterlund, (2007). 
Recently, this line of research has received further support not only from 
experiments on students (Buser et al. 2014), but also by analyzing agents in the 
process of making economic choices in labor markets as in Flory, Leibbrandt, and 
List (2015). These latter authors find that women are relatively less likely to apply 
for a job with a competitive payment scheme than are men. Thus it may be 
expected that female beliefs about their relative performance with respect to 
competitors may explain why they more frequently ask for compensation methods 
more oriented to fixed salaries, rather than payment by results. 
A related aspect is the existence of large gender differences in the propensity to 
choose competitive environments, because women may dislike performing when 
they are competing against others. Different attitudes of women who tend to ‘shy 
away from competition’, as shown by Niederle and Vesterlund, (2007) may end 
up discouraging a competitive climate in working places. The rationale behind 
this explanation, offered by Niederle and Vesterlund, (2007, p. 1070), is that 
“while the prospect of engaging in a future competition may cause women to 
anticipate a psychic cost and deter them from tournaments, men may anticipate a 
psychic benefit and instead be drawn to them” (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). 
Likely, other experimental works, as Booth and Nolen (2012), find differences 
between the male and female competitive choices also suggesting that observed 
gender differences may reflect more social learning rather than ‘innate attitudes’3. 
In this perspective, surveyed by Booth and Nolen (2009), a behavioural approach 
may reveal a fruitful line of research. Indeed, other useful insights are obtained by 
considering gender differentials in preferences, as argued below. 
Preferences  
Another aspect of pay incentive schemes arises from the potential trade-off 
between extrinsic and intrinsic motivations, since contingent rewards may conflict 
with intrinsic motivation, so impairing performance (Benabou and Tirole, 2003) 
and also for this trade off gender differentials are conceivable. 
For instance, for Sweden, Adams and Funk (2012) show that female and male 
firm directors differ systematically not only in their risk attitudes, but also core 
values. Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) find sex differences in altruism, arguing 
that such systematic differences could be relevant whenever altruism may be a 
factor in economic decisions. One of these area of decisions concerns leadership: 
Rosener (1995) and Book (2000) find that female leaders encourage participation 
from their subordinates, favour inclusion, are more cooperative and less 
hierarchical. Dezso and Ross (2012) show that women in top management 
motivate women in middle management and improve firm performance when the 
firm’s strategy is focused on innovation.  
Notice that intrinsic motivation, such as fairness and cooperative attitudes, 
represent important enforcement mechanisms for labour discipline and long-term 
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 Booth and Nolen (2012) find that gender differences in risk preferences are absent in single-sex 
schools, but are present in coed schools.  
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employment relationships, mainly in workplace characterized by incomplete 
contracts (Fehr and Gachter, 2000). Also, as focussed by Akerlof and Kranton 
(2005, p.11), “sense of identity and attachment to an organization is critical to 
well-functioning enterprises”. Thus, as proposed by these authors, identity-
enhanced models offer a new view of a variety of management policies and 
organizational behaviour and in these models, the importance of connecting pay 
of CEOs to firm performance is critically reconsidered. Indeed, top executives 
would have better incentives if their identity were bound up in their position in the 
firm. It also means that different sense of identity, related to specific behavioural 
and psychological traits of female managers, may play some role in explaining 
their compensation structure. These considerations seem relevant when female 
leadership favour cooperative attitudes in working places, encouraging the 
evolution of social norms, based on gift exchange, that enhance reputation, trust 
and learning processes. In the entrepreneurship literature, Bird and Brush (2002) 
argue that organizations under female control tend to have flatter structures and 
often develop relational and nurturing strategies.  
Some evidence in this direction has been provided by the study of Schwartz 
and Rubel, (2005), based on a sample covering 70 countries. The authors find that 
men attribute more importance to self-direction values and power, although 
cultural context moderates gender differences. Furthermore, the study already 
mentioned of Adams and Funk (2012) find that female firm directors in Sweden 
are more benevolent and universally concerned, less power-oriented than men, 
less traditional and security-oriented than their male counterparts. Other studies 
based on game theoretic models try to ascertain the presence of gender differences 
in altruism and fairness, but this literature has so far provided mixed results 
(Azmat and Petrongolo, 2014).  In any case, the survey contribution of Bertrand 
(2010) assesses that “There is a quite a lot of field evidence consistent with higher 
level of altruism and stronger preferences for redistribution among 
women”(p.1555). 
In our perspective, although the external validity of available laboratory studies 
has to be considered with caution and to date only a limited amount of research 
explores their role on labour market outcomes (Bertrand, 2011), we may 
hypothesize that gender differences in preferences and behavioural traits may play 
a role in earnings’ structures. Thus, we expect that if men are less risk averse, 
more self confident and more oriented to competition they more frequently 
voluntary ask for variable payments, whereas women prefer non competitive piece 
rates. We will verify this hypothesis below for the Italian family managers. 
Concerning the second theme, as shown in related literature (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997), it is widely acknowledge that controlling owners, such as the case 
of family firms, are able and motivated to exercise control by obtaining significant 
gains by their monitoring activity, thus in these firms the classic owner-manager 
conflict referred to as Agency Problem I (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), is 
mitigated by the presence of family controlling owners. It implies that executive 
rewards might be lower and a lower level of managerial salaries is accompanied 
by a weaker link to company performance (McConaughy, 2000). However, also in 
family business firms, as argued by Morck and Yeung (2003), managers may act 
in the interests of the controlling family, but not in those of firm’s stakeholders, 
such as other minority owners or employees. Therefore, in these enterprises the 
entrenchment of controlling families and the frequent use of pyramidal groups to 
separate ownership from control are conducive to new conflicts of interest, i.e. to 
a second type of conflict (Agency problem II). Therefore, also in these enterprises, 
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to mitigate the disalignment of interests of majority owners and other firm’s 
stakeholders, a share of management rewards may include payments sensitive to 
performance, such as cash bonuses and equity compensation. 
However, the adoption of these variable payments raises many issues, also 
related to preferences and attitudes of agents. Among others, two main 
controversial issues are trade-offs between incentive effects and exposure to risk, 
and between extrinsic and intrinsic motivations. Here potential gender disparities 
may come to forefront, as discussed above.  
 
 
3.Data and descriptive statistics 
 
3.1 Data 
Our empirical analysis is based on information obtained by the Employer and 
Employee Surveys (RIL) that were conducted by ISFOL in 2010 on a 
representative sample of partnerships and limited liability firms that operated in 
the non-agricultural private sector. The ISFOL-RIL survey collects a rich set of 
information about employment composition, personnel organization, industrial 
relations and other workplace characteristics. The questionnaire also collects 
information regarding some characteristics of corporate governance (ownerships/ 
control and management structure). In particular, each firm was asked if it is 
owned or controlled by a family (Family Firm) and if the person who manages the 
enterprise is a member of the family that owns and/or controls the company, or is 
a professional manager (not a member of the family owner). Then we selected the 
subsample of firms run by family members, who are expected to have more 
discretionary power in setting the composition of their rewards. Concerning this 
latter variable, i.e. compensation of family managers which is the key dependent 
variable of our estimates, each firm was asked whether its top manager receives 
only a fixed salary or also a variable pay (cash bonuses and equity compensation) 
linked to some indicators of enterprise performance. Thus we have a dummy 
variable iVE  that is equal to 1 if the compensation of top management of firm i 
includes a variable component and 0 otherwise. This binary dependent variable 
thus indicates only the payment or non-payment of a variable pay scheme, not its 
detailed components.  
Other information on top managers concerns gender, as well as age and 
educational levels. Furthermore, from the dataset, we obtain information on other 
firm personnel policies (such as the use of fixed-term contracts), industrial 
relations (such as the bargaining of variable payments for the workforce, linked to 
the enterprise performance).  
The questionnaire also asks whether the firm is: i) a unit of a national group 
(National Group); ii) a division of an international group (International Group); 
iii) does not belong to any group (No Group). In addition, we control for sectors 
and regions (NUTS 1) in which firms are located. We also excluded firms with 
less than five employees to retain only those firms characterized by a minimum 
level of organizational structure. However, in a second step, as an additional 
robustness check, we also performed estimates for two subsamples, the first 
includes only micro-firms (those with less than 10 employees) whose incidence in 
Italy is the highest in Europe (in 2008 their share of total value added was 
approximately 33 percent, well above the European average of only 19 percent 
(Bank of Italy, 2013, p. 5). The second subsample covers all other (larger) firms. 
Notice that we exclude firms with missing data for the key variables.  
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Finally, in our estimates potential omitted variables bias can be addressed 
through the use of instruments for  family managers’ gender. Indeed, we require 
an instrumental-variable that can predict gender of family managers, without 
directly affecting the probability that these family managers receive variable 
earning schemes. As suggested by Lazear (2004), managers may be endowed with 
a set of general skills, and tertiary education offers more generalist abilities than 
upper secondary education (which is more specialised in providing vocational 
training). Then we employ as instrument for the share of women who run the firm, 
the share of women with tertiary education at the provincial level in 2001, 
calculated on the basis of Census data. The rationale behind this choice is that the 
educational endowments of the female population found in local markets in 2001 
persist over time and are positively associated with the educational levels and thus 
with the share of female managers operating in the same geographical area in 
2010. In other words, a large share of women who are graduates in a given 
province in 2001 implies a high probability of finding a high fraction of women 
who manage firms within the same province ten years later. Conversely, it is 
unlikely that the provincial share of women with tertiary education in 2001 is 
strongly correlated with the incidence of variable earning of managers in the same 
area in 2010.  
Detailed definitions of variables are reported in Table A1.  
 
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1 reports the means and standard deviations of selected variables. 
Concerning personal characteristics of family management (gender, age and 
education) we find that only 14 per cent of firms have female top management, 
and that Italian family firms have on average 12 percent of prime-age managers 
(i.e. managers aged between 18 and 40 years), whereas the most representative 
group is between 39 and 60 (around 60 per cent), followed by the group of senior 
management (aged more than 59). Concerning education, we observe that twenty 
per cent of managers has a tertiary degree of education, whereas the proportions 
of managers with at most secondary or primary education stand at around 55 and 
25 percent, respectively. On average, 37 per cent of top managers receive a 
reward at least partially linked to firm performance. These summary indicators, 
taken as whole, thus indicate that male and middle age management, with at most 
a secondary degree of education, is the most representative group of executives 
who run the Italian family firms.  
A useful comparison of personal characteristics of managers and their 
subordinates are offered by data on gender and educational composition of the 
labour force. We find that the share of female employees is higher; the class of 
employees with at most primary education is the highest group and represents 
nearly around one half of the whole labour force, whereas only 7% of employees 
has a tertiary level of education. Table 1 also shows that the share of trained 
workers is around only one fifth of total employees and that the share of workers 
with fixed-term contracts represents 14% of the total workforce in 2010. Data on 
performance related pay schemes offered to employees  shows the limited 
diffusion of  these schemes, that are present only in 4 % of surveyed firms in 
2010. 
The sectoral distribution of firms records its highest value for manufacturing 
firms (29%), followed by Retail and Wholesale Trade firms (23%). Additional 
characteristics offer a profile of the majority of Italian enterprises not involved in 
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R&D (only 10% of firms had undertaken R&D), not exposed to international 
trade (only 23% were exporters), and not belonging, in the vast majority of cases ( 
97%), to a national or multinational group. This latter trait is in conformity with 
the dimensional portrait of Italian family firms: even excluding firms with fewer 
than 5 employees, the majority of sampled firms (nearly 79%) employs less than 
15 employees.  
 
4. Econometric Analysis 
4.1 The econometric strategy 
Our research question concerns the role of gender of family management in the 
structure of managerial compensation packages, i.e. in the probability that these 
packages include variable payments linked to performance (cash and/or equity 
bonuses). 
Thus, we begin our econometric analysis by estimating different specifications 
of the following equation:  
 
(1)    iiii YFemaleVC    
 
where the dependent variable VEi   is the payment of a variable earning scheme 
of any type by firm i, to his top family managers, Female is a dummy variable that 
assumes the value equal to 1 if the top  manager is a woman and 0 otherwise. Xi  is 
a vector that describes the composition of the workforce, Yi is a vector of other 
firm and workplace characteristics (for details, see Table A1 in the Appendix) and 
i  is an idiosyncratic error term. 
As our dependent variable is either zero or one, we estimate its determinants 
with probit regressions which fit a cumulative normal distribution. We thus 
estimate a nonlinear Probit specification of equation (1) to account for the 
dichotomous nature of the VE variable (Wooldrige, 2001).  
Potential problems with this empirical strategy, however, concern firms’ 
unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity issues. In particular, if there are 
unobservable factors that influence both the share of female managers and the 
presence of VE schemes at the firm level, our Probit estimates might suffer from 
omitted variables bias. For example, female family managers may be likely to 
concentrate in firms where only fixed salary are paid, rather than variable earning, 
or they may run firms characterised by low-quality practices and industrial 
relations, characteristics that might be likely to be associated with the limited use 
of VE. In such circumstances, negative estimates of the association between 
female managers’ and the use of variable compensation (hereafter denoted as VE) 
may partially reflect unobserved firm heterogeneity rather than gender and 
behavioural traits associated with the sex of managers. To minimise these biases, 
we estimate different specifications of equation (1) by including a large set of 
variables that capture important observable and unobservable characteristics of 
firms, managers and workers.  
Furthermore, potential omitted variables bias can be addressed through the 
use of instruments for the share of female managers. Thus, we require 
instrumental-variables that can predict the probability of having a female mangers, 
without directly affecting the probability of VE. As said above, we employ as 
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instrument for the share of women who own and run the firm, the share of women 
with tertiary education at the provincial level in 2001, calculated on the basis of 
Census data. 
Finally, as additional robustness checks, we also performed estimates for two 
smaller sub-sample of firms: i) with less than 10 employees, and ii) with more 
than 10 employees. The choice of the threshold of 10 employees permits to 
include or exclude all micro- firms, according to the classification adopted by 
EUROSTAT. These firms, that in Italy represents 19% of the total number of 
enterprises in industry and services and are responsible for employing more than 
23% of workers, are particularly common in services and are more oriented to the 
regional market (ISTAT, 2013), thus they may be characterized by compensation 
systems that are different from those adopted by other, larger firms.  
 
4.2. Probit estimates  
 
The findings for our VE estimates, reported in Table 2, indicate that the 
presence of female family management, the dummy variable Female, is 
significantly and negatively associated with the probability of adopting VE, 
compared to the presence of male family management (the omitted category). 
These results are obtained, first, with the most parsimonious specification, where 
we control for managers’ age and education and a few number of firm’ s 
characteristics (ownership and size, firm’s associations with other business units 
and geographical location (Model 1). Secondly, these results are also supported by 
specifications in which additional covariates for firm characteristics (Model 2) 
and workforce characteristics (Model 3) are added. Similarly, in estimations of 
Model 1 and 2 the coefficient for the dummy variable Female is 5.1% and 5.6%. 
However, the estimated coefficient is even larger (-7.6%) when we control for all 
data on firm and workforce characteristics, obtainable from our database (Model 
3). In sum, controlling for a wider set of covariates (Model 3), we obtain a gender 
gap in structure of compensation packages: female family managers receive with a 
lower probability their rewards in the form of variable cash bonuses, equity 
compensations and stock options than do men 
For control variables a thorough analysis will be proposed below, when we 
present IV estimation that corrects for heterogeneities and endogeneity biases. In 
any case, for Probit estimates, we limit to observe the following results (last 
specification, Model 3 of Table 2): more educated managers, operating in larger 
no-family firms, best performing in terms of Return of Sales (ln Ros) and mainly 
localised in Northern regions, are less prone than their counterparts to be paid by 
VE schemes. We also obtain that firms characterised by staff in higher positions 
(executives and white collars), who hire less precarious workers (that is, with 
relatively few fixed-term contracts) and with a large male workforce component 
show a minor propensity to compensate their managers with variable pay 
schemes.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
4.2.2 IV Probit Results 
In all specifications presented so far the coefficient for the female dummy 
variable is statistically significant but relatively small in magnitude, within the 
range of 5.1%-7.6%. However, as noted above, the Probit estimates are subject to 
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potential biases, due to possible unobserved heterogeneities and omitted variables. 
To mitigate these effects, we employ IV estimations. The second-stage IV Probit 
estimates, performed for the most complete model that includes all controls, offer 
validation of our main hypothesis: the presence of female family management is 
negatively associated with the use of incentive policies (VE), and the magnitude of 
this impact is higher than in previous estimates, so that, controlling for 
endogeneity clearly increases the measured impact of gender on adoption of VE: 
the coefficient for this variable is much higher (48%), and significant at the 1% 
level (Table 3). This result confirms that our instrumental variables help reduce 
the downward bias due to measurement errors (Griliches & Hausman, 1986). The 
validity of our strategy is given by the coefficient obtained for our external 
instrument (described above) that shows the expected sign and is significant at the 
1% level (column b, Table 3). The validity of the instrument is also confirmed by 
the standard identification tests (see last rows of Table 3). 
Our main result obtained from Probit estimates is confirmed by IV Probit 
results: from Table 3, one can observe that when human capital variables, 
composition of occupation and firm characteristics are controlled for (Model 3), 
approximately 48% of the adoption of contingent schemes to reward top 
executives is explained by gender different propensities for these schemes. Thus, 
also IV Probit estimates confirm that the probability that managers are 
compensated with contingent rewards is lower for the female component.  
For most of our control variables, the IV Probit estimates confirm our previous 
Probit results, although some changes relate to education and age of top 
management (not significant in the IV estimates). 
Controls 
Managers’ characteristics  
We first control for human capital and demographic attributes of management 
because one can expect that part of the gender gap in pay structure could be 
explained by these factors, rather than gender identity. For example, gender could 
have an influence on pay structure not because female managers are different 
form men, but because the group of female management in ours sample differs 
from the group of male management in terms of some characteristics, such as 
human capital and age, potentially correlated with our dependent variable, rather 
than with gender attributes. Thus, we first control for an observable such as 
education, as education is acknowledged to be one of the most important 
components of general human capital and also captures the role of a 
multidimensional set of observable and unobservable skills that are relevant in the 
choice of practices in human resource management, such as incentive systems 
(Damiani and Ricci, 2014). In addition, we introduce age, an attribute that may be 
correlated with individual features such as risk aversion and professional 
experience, under the hypothesis that returns to age and experience are potential 
determinants of managerial compensation and pay structure (Vieito and. Khan, 
2012; Kulich et al. 2011). Our IV results clearly show that the parameter estimate 
of the gender dummy Female is statistically significant controlling for different 
levels of education and classes of age (primary education and ages lower than 39 
the omitted categories), thus suggesting that the phenomenon of the gender gap in 
pay structure is not merely driven by these attributes. Notice also that in contrast 
with Probit estimates, education and age lost their significance in IV Probit 
estimates. 
In sum, controlling for managers’ characteristics, from our results  it might be 
argued that inherent differences by sex in risk aversion, exposure to competition 
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and expected tenure are likely determinants of adoption of VE. Indeed, if women 
are more risk averse and have shorter expected tenure than men, they 
consequently are less likely than men in schemes that include payment by results, 
especially in forms of deferred compensation such as stock options and equity 
compensation (Goldin, 1986; Heywood and Jirjahn, 2002). Thus, as in Manning 
and Saidi (2010), we may use the presence of a variable earning scheme as an 
indicator of a more competitive workplace and gender differences in the form of 
pay as a reflection of differentials in preferences in terms of competitiveness, 
motivation and ambition, although we interpret our results with caution, because 
our variables do not reflect all measures of differences in risk preferences, 
attitudes towards competition, and social preferences that laboratory experiments 




The role of size is another important control, as shown by Bertrand and 
Hallock (2001). If women in top managerial positions are less present in much 
smaller firms than men, a significant negative coefficient associated of VE with 
the female dummy variable could only reflect the lower attitude of small firms to 
adopt contingent rather than fixed rewards. However, our IV regression, that 
controls for size, shows the negative role of female leadership and offers 
confirmation that gender gap in pay structure cannot be attributed only to a 
dimensional effect. Notice that concerning adoption of VE payments, the expected 
role of size is not clear cut since the compensation literature suggests two opposite 
effects. On one hand, asymmetric information and monitoring costs increase with 
firm size and explain the positive correlation of size with VE schemes. 
Furthermore, larger firms can more easily afford costly strategies such as the 
upgrading of management through implementation of VE schemes, also because 
economies of scale reduce implementation costs of these schemes and explain 
why benefits of these payments are likely to exceed costs. On the other hand, 
opportunistic behaviour and free-riding arguments are more frequent in large 
firms (where managers may extract benefits in the form of cash bonuses and stock 
options) thus generating an opposite, negative correlation. For instance, Jensen 
and Murphy (1990) showed that CEOs of large companies were paid like 
bureaucrats and that their pay packages showed very little variability, so that they  
received small rewards for superior performance but even smaller penalties for 
failures. 
In our case the negative effect prevails: estimates, reported in Table 3, show 
that the probability of VE is negatively correlated with company size, variable 
bonuses paid to management being less frequent in large firms. 
An additional widely debated issue in gender literature is horizontal 
segregation, because women are not uniformly represented in all industries, but 
rather concentrated in some specific industries, such as the social sector (Azmat 
and Petrongolo, 2014). 
Thus, a negative spurious correlation between the female top manager variable 
(Female) and VE may be obtained only because women more likely manage firms 
operating in specific sectors, such as social services and health, that are also 
sectors where variable pay schemes are less likely adopted, whereas women are 
less present in finance, where VE schemes are more frequently implemented. 
However, also controlling for sectors, we obtain the negative effects of the 
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Female dummy variable, suggesting that industrial segregation of female 
executives does not account all gap in compensation structure.  
The presence of a significant gap in pay structure is confirmed controlling for 
ownership structure and thus including a dummy variable equals to one to indicate 
whether a firm is owned and or/controlled by a family and 0 otherwise. The 
hypothesis behind this inclusion is that the separation between ownership and 
control may significantly influence a firm’s choice of strategy, including 
incentives (see among others the overview of  Shleifer and Vishny, 1997 and the 
research paper of Chen et al. 2014). It is argued that ownership concentration in 
the hand of families makes it easier to align the interests of the owners in family 
businesses than in nonfamily ones (Vilaseca, 2002). Indeed, family CEOs in 
family controlled firms have less conflicts of interest, less information asymmetry 
and less self interest with respect to firms not owned nor controlled by families. 
Thus, top managers set themselves a low component of contingent pay in family 
owned firms, (compared to the CEOs of other firms), as found by  Carrasco-
Hernandez, Sánchez-Marín (2007) and Chen et al. 2014. Unexpectedly, and in 
contrast with these studies, we obtain that in Italian firms the probability of 
adoption of payment by results is higher under family ownership and control. Two 
explanations may  be offered. 
The first explanation is that Agency Problem of type II is particularly severe in 
the Italian economy, and VE schemes are potential devices to overcome the 
disalignment of interests of major and minority owners or other stakeholders. 
Indeed, as discussed in section 2, in family firms a second type of conflict appears 
(Agency problem II), because the large owner or shareholder has greater 
incentives for expropriation and another conflict of interests arises, between the 
controlling owner (a family or individual) and minority owners or other 
stakeholders (Claessens et al., 2000, Villalonga and Amit, 2006). Therefore, also 
in such a firm, variable pays, such as equity-based compensation, might contribute 
to the alleviation of agency problems of type II, that might reveal even more 
severe than that featuring the Agency problem of type I. 
A second explanation is that VE may simply mask appropriation of private 
benefits, in line with the camouflage theory (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003) according 
to which payments by results is an attempt to legitimize and obscure excessive 
management rewards and conceal appropriation of private benefits. Thus, in our 
case study it might be that under family control, VE are likely adopted to 
minimize the outrage costs that family firms have to pay whenever stakeholders 
and firm outsiders recognize the presence of rent extraction.  
Both explanations may concur to explain the positive coefficient associated of 
our dependent variable VE with  the dummy variable for family firms. 
As additional control, we take into account whether the firm is a unit of a 
national, local, or multinational group (the omitted category). Also inserting this 
control, our results clearly lead to reject the hypotheses that gender differentials 
are merely driven by not uniform distribution of women across different types of 
firms; in addition we obtain that the probability of VE is higher for firms owned 
and controlled by families but that belong to large multinational groups. One 
hypothesis behind these results is that when the firm is a part of a larger group, 
fixed costs to adopt VE may be spread across establishments within the group. 
Furthermore, VE may be adopted in firms that belong to an international group 
because these companies face different sets of incentives and VE may be an useful 
device to overcome the attitude of Italian family firms, that are otherwise 
“typically reluctant to partly decentralise governance in order to manage complex 
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operations spread in several countries”, as signaled by Barba Navaretti et al. 
(2008, p. 3).  
We have an additional control for Return on sales for employees. This variable 
has been introduced to have a confirmation of the role of the gender dummy 
Female and to exclude the hypothesis that its significance is only the result of a 
heterogeneous presence of female management in companies with different 
performances. Notice also that for performance, two different hypotheses are 
conceivable. First, variable bonuses are supposedly offered to reward managers 
for achieved performance and thus they are concession agreements, mainly 
adopted in those firms with greater ‘ability to pay’. In such a case we expect a 
positive coefficient. Second, variable bonuses are paid to top management likely 
to counterbalance negative results and are thus adopted for their potential role of 
enhancing motivation and commitment (thus expecting a negative coefficient). 
According to our results, the second hypothesis seems to be prevalent for Italian 
firms; in any case when we control for performance we verify that observed  
differentials by gender of pay structure do not simply reflect the fact that women 
manage firms performing well or not.  
Finally, we control for age of firms, their R&D expenses and their presence in 
international markets as exporters. According to IV Probit estimates, the negative 
significant coefficient for the latter variable signals that in exporting firms 
management have lower propensity to be paid with VE schemes. It appears as an 
unexpected result because exposure to international competition may stimulate the 
use of variable pay to provide incentives to top management to enhance their 
efficient leadership (Drago and Heywood 1995). However, this hypothesis is not 
verified for the Italian economy because, as said, our IV results show a significant 
negative association between firms’ presence in international markets and VE. 
This unexpected result may be simply associated to unobservable characteristics 
of exporting Italian firms, mainly operating in traditional and low-tech sectors that 
use inferior technology. Thus, for firms operating in such sectors it is conceivable 
that personnel practices tend to not involve VE and therefore there may be an 
indirect link between respective establishment characteristics and VE practices, 
partially reflecting firm-specific technological factors. IV estimates help resolve, 
at least partially, this bias, which is also mitigated by including industry dummies 
that capture sector-specific technological factors.  
Workers’ characteristics 
Additional controls for workforce composition are included. Interestingly, 
there is a strong confirmation that those establishments with large shares of fixed- 
term contracts, blue collars and female workers were more likely than others to 
use payment by results for their top management. Interestingly, VE schemes paid 
to family management are thus a distinctive feature of those firms that adopt low 
performance workplace practices. These firms are less willing than others to 
invest in long-run industrial relations, recruit workers for less qualified positions 
and have a large share of peripheral workforce (such as female employees, with 
shorter expected tenure and who traditionally prefer jobs that allow for greater 
flexibility between job and family, Zwick, 2004). In sum, the higher probability of 
contingent rewards for top management in companies that adopt inferior 
workplace practices might be coherent with the hypothesis that, at least in our 
case study, variable cash bonuses and equity compensation is also a manifestation 
of agency problem (rather than a solution of this problem), so that VE frequently 
reflect managers’ ability to extract rents, in conformity with the managerial power 
approach (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). In any case, what is more relevant for our 
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analysis is that the significant negative coefficient of our dummy variable Female 
obtained controlling for workers’ characteristics, is not driven by association of 
female management and different patterns of workplace practices. Other 




Our Probit and IV Probit estimates are repeated for two different sub-samples 
that include only micro-firms (firms with less than 10, according to the 
EUROSTAT definition) and firms with more than 10 employees. For both 
subsamples, we adopt the specification that include all controls (Model 3). Probit 
results confirm the significant negative coefficient for the gender dummy variable 
Female for both sub-samples and a greater coefficient for micro-firms. 
Also for these two subsamples we adopt the same econometric strategy already 
presented for the whole sample and thus we carried out instrumental variable 
estimates. With this strategy we take into account omitted variables biases and 
endogeneity issues, due to the fact that firms that adopt VE may attract a lower 
share of female management. The IV Probit estimates, performed for the most 
comprehensive specification (Model 3), permit to verify that our key regressor is 
exogenous and confirm that particularly for micro-firms the share of female top 




Laboratory experiments and analyses based on economic models of identity 
and work incentives have shown that the unexplained gender pay gap is not only 
attributable to human capital and sector segregation, or merely caused by sex 
discrimination, but also by unobservable differences, such as sex heterogeneities 
in preferences and lower long-term career commitment among women and men. 
However, most studies have documented these gender disparities on the general 
population, on students or workers in subordinate positions, but only few studies 
have focused on gender compensation differentials among top executives. Notice 
also that gender disparities might be minimized in the group of top executives, 
because women and men who climb the corporate ladder and reach the top of the 
firm hierarchy may share similar preferences, such as high career ambition and 
risk preferences, irrespective on their gender identity. Thus, it has been argued 
that if women must be like men to break the ‘glass ceiling’, it is likely that 
differences fade away at the high level of corporate hierarchy (Adams and Funk, 
2012). 
So far, these claims have been tested (and refuted) only in a limited number of 
studies focused on women at the top of the corporate ladder and mainly restricted 
to gender disparities in  relative compensation (Bertrand and Hallock, 2001) or 
value priorities and risk attitudes (Adams and Funk, 2012), whereas only limited 
attention has been paid to the structure of managerial compensation packages.  
This paper highlights this dimension and considers not the level but the form of 
pay, thus estimating gender differences in pay structure. Notice also that previous 
research has shown that a large share of differences in pay levels between women 
and men are explained by the higher representation of women in lower-paying 
occupations and lower-paying firms within occupations (Chauvin and Ash, 1994; 
Bertrand and Hallock, 2001). In our analysis we considered a fairly homogenous 
group, represented by family top executives who run the firm, so that a gap in 
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compensation structure between women and men might be more convincingly 
explained by differences in motivation and preferences. Furthermore, by focusing 
on family managers in leadership position, and thus with a great bargaining power 
in setting their rewards, gender disparities are less likely related to sex 
discrimination, but are more linked to identity and commitment. Finally, the 
introduction in our estimates of a large set of controls for firm characteristics has 
permitted to identify the conditional gender gap that is not attributable to the 
under-representation of women in firms that offer less frequently contingent 
earnings. Similarly, controlling for sectors, has permitted to unveil evidence of 
sex disparities not accounted by sectoral segregation. 
From our data set, that covers a wide cross-section of firms, we obtain some 
interesting results. The gender pay differential manifests in the form of pay and 
when controlling for firm and workforce attributes we still find significant 
negative effects of women at the top in firm hierarchy. These results seem to 
suggest that in Italian firms women in leadership position opt more frequently for 
fixed salary than do men, in conformity with the hypotheses advanced in recent 
gender literature, that they dislike competition, are more risk averse and less self-
confident than their men colleagues. Furthermore, women shorter expected tenure 
with respect than that featuring their male counterparts may explain why women 
are less motivated by deferred compensation such as stock options and equity 
compensation.  
Summing up, we use the presence of a variable earning scheme as an indicator 
of a more competitive workplace, as in Manning and Saidi (2010), and we suggest 
that lower representation of women in variable earning schemes might signal their 
minor attitudes toward competition. However, we interpret our results with 
caution, because our variables do not reflect all measures of differences in 
attitudes towards competition and related personal traits (risk aversion and social 
preferences) that laboratory experiments have found to be relevant. Additional 
research aimed at investigating these issues on the basis of a richer database that 
includes details on personal motivations, family status and individual 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics   
 
    
 
Mean St. dev. Min. Max. 
Managers’ characteristics 
    Variable Earnings (VE) 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Female Entrepreneurs 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Tertiary education 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Upper secondary education 0.55 0.50 0 1 
Primary and lower second. education 0.25 0.43 0 1 
age>59 0.27 0.44 0 1 
39 <age<60 0.60 0.49 0 1 
18 <age <40 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Firm ownership and control 
    
Family firm 0.96 0.19 0 1 
International Group 0.01 0.08 0 1 
National Group  0.05 0.21 0 1 
No group 0.95 0.22 0 1 
Workforce characteristics 
    
% tertiary education 0.07 0.16 0 1 
% upper secondary education 0.45 0.32 0 1 
% lower secondary education 0.48 0.35 0 1 
% executives 0.03 0.10 0 1 
% white collars 0.35 0.32 0 1 
% blue collars 0.62 0.34 0 1 
% females 0.38 0.31 0 1 
% trained 0.17 0.32 0 1 
% fixed term contracts 0.14 0.22 0 1 
Other Firm characteristics 
    
Ln (Ros per  employee) 11.63 1.18 3.14 19.50 
Performance related pay 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Firm age 19.49 15.78 0 814 
R&D 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Foreign market 0.21 0.41 0 1 
5< n. employees<15 0.83 0.37 0 1 
14< n. employees<50 0.14 0.35 0 1 
49< n. employees<250 0.03 0.16 0 1 
N. employees>249 0.00 0.05 0 1 
North West 0.30 0.46 0 1 
North East 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Centre 0.22 0.41 0 1 
South 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Quarrying, Mining etc 0.00 0.05 0 1 
Manufacturing 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Electricity, water and gas distribution 0.01 0.09 0 1 
Construction 0.15 0.35 0 1 
Retail and wholesale 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Transportation  0.03 0.18 0 1 
Hotels and restaurants  0.11 0.31 0 1 
Intermediation, real estate and rental 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Information, comm.. and  others  0.08 0.27 0 1 
Health, education and social services 0.02 0.14 0 1 
Sports, entertainment and other 0.03 0.16 0 1 




Table 2:  Probit estimates of family managers Variable Earnings (VE)  
marginal effects 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
dy/dx   std err dy/dx   std err dy/dx   std err 
Managers’  characteristics 
         Female  -0.051 *** 0.012 -0.056 *** 0.012 -0.076 *** 0.014 
Tertiary education  -0.090 *** 0.014 -0.075 *** 0.014 -0.040 *** 0.015 
Upper secondary education  -0.064 *** 0.010 -0.055 *** 0.010 -0.040 *** 0.011 
age>59 0.048 *** 0.014 0.066 *** 0.014 0.081 *** 0.016 
39 <age<60 0.044 *** 0.014 0.054 *** 0.015 0.058 *** 0.016 
Firm ownership and control 
    
Family firm  0.171 *** 0.023 0.152 *** 0.023 0.171 *** 0.026 
National group -0.098 ** 0.049 -0.086 * 0.051 -0.112 * 0.062 
No group -0.090 ** 0.044 -0.080 * 0.046 -0.131 ** 0.057 
Workforce characteristics 
         % tertiary education 




% upper secondary education 





      
-0.414 *** 0.060 
% white collars 
      
-0.146 *** 0.027 
% females 
      
0.128 *** 0.020 
% trained 




% fixed term contracts 
      
0.078 *** 0.025 
Other firm characteristics 
         ln(Ros per employee) 
   
-0.022 *** 0.003 -0.016 *** 0.004 
Performance related pay  







   
-0.001 *** 0.000 0.000 ** 0.000 
R&D 
   




   
-0.054 *** 0.010 -0.055 *** 0.012 
14< n. employees<50 -0.154 *** 0.010 -0.149 *** 0.010 -0.155 *** 0.011 
49< n. employees<250 -0.209 *** 0.016 -0.186 *** 0.016 -0.194 *** 0.022 
n. employees>249 -0.150 *** 0.035 -0.129 *** 0.035 -0.118 *** 0.044 









0.021 -0.027 *** 0.021 
South 0.035 * 0.021 0.023 
 
0.022 0.024 *** 0.020 
Sectors yes yes yes 
          Wald chi2 1232.05 1859.09 2270.78 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.061 0.066 0.076 
N. of observations 12504 11897 9636  
Notes: Omitted variables: managers with lower secondary and primary education and age <40 %. workers with 
lower secondary and primary education. South; n. of employees<15, International  groups. Robust standard 









Second stage  First stage  
 
dy/dx   St. err. coef   St. err. 
Managers’ characteristics 
      Female  -0.481 ** 0.231 
   Tertiary education  -0.021 
 
0.019 0.030 *** 0.011 
Upper secondary education  -0.013 
 
0.021 0.049 *** 0.009 
age>59 0.043 
 
0.030 -0.069 *** 0.013 
39 <age<60 0.040 * 0.022 -0.027 ** 0.012 
Firm ownership and control 
    
Family firm  0.158 *** 0.030 0.018 
 
0.011 
National group -0.096 * 0.053 0.009 
 
0.034 




     
 
% executives -0.343 *** 0.080 0.042 
 
0.048 
% white collars -0.158 *** 0.028 -0.080 *** 0.022 










% females 0.183 *** 0.031 0.172 *** 0.018 
% trained 0.023 
 
0.015 0.029 *** 0.010 
% fixed term contracts 0.082 *** 0.024 0.035 
 
0.022 
Other firm characteristics 
     
 
ln (Ros per  employee) -0.019 *** 0.004 -0.012 *** 0.003 













Foreign market -0.051 *** 0.014 -0.004 
 
0.010 
14< n. employees<50 -0.142 *** 0.023 -0.014 
 
0.009 
49< n. employees<250 -0.189 *** 0.026 -0.045 *** 0.012 
N. employees>249 -0.128 *** 0.039 -0.063 ** 0.025 
North East -0.016 
 
0.018 -0.015 * 0.009 
Centre -0.024 
 











 % local  tertiary education 
1971 
   
2,117 *** 0.342 
Constant 
   
0.195 *** 0.060 
Athrho 





   
-1,107 *** 0.017 
       Rho 









Wald test of exogeneity 
      chi2 
   
2.11 
  Prob>chi2 
   
0.1459 
  Wald chi2 3108.32 
Prob > chi2 0.000 
N. of observations 9636 
Notes: Omitted variables: managers with lower secondary and primary education and age <40 %. workers with 
lower secondary and primary education. South; n. of employees<15, International  groups. Robust standard 




Table 4: Probit estimates of family managers Variable Earnings (VE): subsamples of 
firms under 10 employees and more than 10 employees 
 
under 10 employees more than 10 employees 
 
dy/dx   std err dy/dx   std err 
Managers’ characteristics 
      Female -0.083 *** 0.020 -0.063 *** 0.019 
Tertiary education -0.048 ** 0.021 -0.043 ** 0.017 
Upper secondary education -0.018 
 
0.016 -0.065 *** 0.015 
age>59 0.073 *** 0.025 0.088 *** 0.022 
39 <age<60 0.066 *** 0.020 0.050 ** 0.024 
Family firm 0.225 *** 0.044 0.142 *** 0.027 























% executives -0.480 *** 0.078 -0.363 *** 0.112 
% white collars -0.206 *** 0.038 -0.079 ** 0.036 
% females 0.190 *** 0.030 0.061 * 0.032 











   ln(Ros per  employee) -0.012 * 0.006 -0.018 *** 0.005 
Performance related pay 0.075 * 0.039 -0.021 
 
0.022 
Firm age 0.001 
 






foreign market -0.086 *** 0.022 -0.037 ** 0.017 





















       Wald chi2 535.68 428.21 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.054 0.046 
N. of observations 4698 4938 
Notes: Omitted variables: managers with lower secondary and primary education and age <40 %. 
workers with lower secondary and primary education. South; n. of employees<15, International  






Table 5: IV Probit estimates of family managers Variable Earnings (VE) 
subsamples of firms under 10 employees and more than 10 employees 
 
under 10 employees over 10 employees 
 
second stage first stage  second stage frist stage 
 
dy/dx   st er coef   st er dy/dx   st er coef   st er 
Managers’ characteristics  
            Female  -0.539 ** 0.215 






Tertiary education  -0.020 
 
0.027 0.035 ** 0.018 -0.036 
 
0.023 0.025 * 0.013 
Upper secondary education  0.007 
 
0.021 0.042 *** 0.013 -0.051 * 0.031 0.055 *** 0.011 
age>59 0.017 
 
0.040 -0.092 *** 0.019 0.076 ** 0.034 -0.045 ** 0.019 
39 <age<60 0.035 
 
0.028 -0.041 ** 0.017 0.047 * 0.026 -0.009 
 
0.016 
Firm ownership and control 
    
family firm 0.187 *** 0.051 0.006 
 
0.029 0.144 *** 0.026 0.023 * 0.013 






0.069 0.067 *** 0.016 
















% executives -0.368 *** 0.113 0.041 
 
0.060 -0.341 *** 0.102 0.060 
 
0.072 
% white collars -0.214 *** 0.038 -0.105 *** 0.027 -0.083 ** 0.034 -0.031 
 
0.027 
% tertiary education 0.005 
 











0.034 -0.046 ** 0.018 
% females 0.250 *** 0.031 0.205 *** 0.024 0.086 
 
0.055 0.129 *** 0.028 
% trained 0.026 
 
0.018 0.023 * 0.014 0.016 
 
0.025 0.031 ** 0.015 




0.047 0.073 ** 0.034 









ln(Ros per employee) -0.021 *** 0.007 -0.024 *** 0.005 -0.018 *** 0.005 -0.003 
 
0.004 

























































Sectors yes yes yes yes 
% local  tert.educ.1971 
   
2.773 *** 0.466 
   
1.328 *** 0.510 
constant 
   
0.470 *** 0.123 




             athrho 









   
-1.066 *** 0.019 
   
-1.157 *** 0.020 
             rho 

















             Wald test of exogeneity 
            chi2 
   
2.43 
   
0.26 
Prob>chi2 
   
0.119 
   
0.610 
             Wald chi2 639.73 492.79 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 
N. of observations 4698 4938 
Notes: Omitted variables: managers with lower secondary and primary education and age <40 %. workers with 
lower secondary and primary education. South; n. of employees<15, International  groups. Robust standard 





Table A1: Variable definitions 
Managers’ gender  
Female  
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the entrepreneur is a female 
and 0 otherwise 
Education of managers and workforce  
Tertiary education  
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the manager of the firm  has 
a tertiary education (post-secondary education) and 0 
otherwise 
Upper Secondary education 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if  the manager of the firm  
has a upper secondary education and 0 otherwise 
Lower Secondary and Primary 
education 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the manager of the firm has 









Firm ownership and control  
Family firm A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is run by family 
owners and 0 otherwise 




A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm  belongs to a 
international group  
No group 
 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm does not belong to 
any group  
Other firm characteristics  
Firm Size   The total number of employees divided in four classes by size 
Performance related pay A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm adopts for its 
workforce a payment by results of any type and 0 otherwise 
Foreign market  A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is an exporter and 0 
otherwise. 
Ln (Ros) The percentage return on sales. operating profits/total sales (ln 
transformation) 
Firm age  The age of firms 
R&D A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm undertook R&D 
and 0 otherwise 
Workforce characteristics   
% Fixed-term contracts  The percentage of fixed-term employees 
% Training  The percentage of total employees trained 
% Females The percentage of women relative to the total number of 
employees 
Immigrants Share of immigrant employees 
Geographical location   
North-West  A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is localized in 
Italy’s North-Western regions and 0 otherwise 
North-East A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is localized in 
Italy’s North-Eastern regions and 0 otherwise 
Centre  A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is localized in 
Italy’s Central regions. and 0 otherwise 
South A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is localized in 
Italy’s Southern regions and 0 otherwise 
Instrument  
Share of graduates 2001 The province/sectoral share of women with a tertiary level of 
schooling relative to the total population. drawn from the 
Census data of 2001. 
 
